Paul
Goble
Staunton, July 2 – The analogies
people use to describe their situation often say far more than do their direct
declarative statements because the former, unlike the latter, often provide the
unspoken context for the thinking of those involved. That is what makes some of the analogies
being drawn in Moscow now both instructive and terrifying.
In a commentary on the IARex.ru news
agency, Mikhail Aleksandrov says that “the current diplomatic maneuvers around the
situation in Ukraine bring to mind certain historical parallels,” specifically
that Putin’s Russia today finds itself in the same position Hitler’s Germany
did just before World War II (iarex.ru/articles/48915.html).
“The current political situation in
Europe in its essentials very much recalls that which existed on the eve of the
second world war. The same unjust
Versailles peace arrangement, the same dismemberment of the German nation, the
same discrimination of German communities in the newly-formed petty states, the
same policy of the West around Germany,” he writes.
But then he concludes “Only now
instead of Germany, there is Russia.”
As disturbing as this suggestion
that Moscow now is in the position of Berlin in 1939 and by implication should
act in the same way, even more worrisome are Aleksandrov’s analysis of Stalin’s
mistakes in the pre-war period and his call for Putin to use military force in Ukraine
and elsewhere lest Moscow again find itself facing a new invasion.
President Putin has said that “the
Russian leadership will never again permit a repetition of the catastrophe of
June 1941.” It is certainly the case, Aleksandrov says, that “the crisis in
Ukraine has created a mortal threat to Russian statehood,” but by “an irony of
fate,” the Kremlin leader of today is acting as if that is not the case and
thus repeating “the mitakes of his great predecessor, I.V. Stalin.”
In 1925, Stalin prophetically said
that a war in Europe was inevitable, that the USSR would be drawn into it, and
that, in order to prepare for that, Moscow mustarrange things so that the
country would become involved as late as possible, Aleksandrov recounts, adding
that “this plan seemed ideal.”
For 16 years, Stalin followed it
consistently, but “life turned out to be more complicated than any plans.” And the Soviet leader took steps that
ultimately led to exactly what he did not want and could have avoided.
In the early 1930s, Aleksandrov
says, “Soviet diplomacy bean to conduct a policy directed at the creation in
Europe of a system of collective security.”
But given Western interests and attitudes, “this course was not
realistic.”
One result was the Soviet-French
treaty on joint guarantees to Czechoslovaia, an agreement in which Moscow
agreed to act only after Paris did. “If
the Munich crisis of 1938 had led to war, then Stalin’s plan could have been
realized,” with a war in Europe “beginning without the direct participation of
the USSR,” giving Moscow the opportunity to pick its time.
But war did not begin over
Czechoslovakia but rather over Poland.
Stalin believed that he has done the right thing again by concluding the
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and thus eliminating the threat of a German
attack. But tht was not to be,
Aleksandrov says, and he suggests that Stalin miscalculated because he thought
the second world war would be like the first.
But this time around, France
capitulated quickly, and Stalin found himself confronted with a united and
antagonistic Europe, on the one hand, and a Japanese threat in the Far East, on
the other. The USSR would have been better
off to denounce Molotov-Ribbentrop and move Soviet forces into eastern Europe.
In late 1939 or early 1940, Soviet
forces coud have “relatively easily defeated the armies of the allies of
Germany, Romania and Hungary, freed Czechoslovakia andYuoslavia and turned to
its side Bulgaria.” Then Moscow could have ormed “pro-Soviet divisions from
among the ranks of local anti-fascists,” puttiing Germany on the defensive.
But “Stalin missed his chance.” Both his confidence in his earlier judgments
and his decision to fulfill all international agreements even when no one else
was “led to tragic consequences,” Aleksandrov writes. In December 1940, Hitler
offered Stalin an alliance, but Moscow rejected that viewing this as “a soft
swallowing of the USSR without a war.”
At the same time, however, the USSR
made concessions to Berling that in effect let it in the position of “a protectorate
of Germany” and ultimately at risk of invasion. Stalin dismissed suggestions
that Hitler would violate his promises and thus put the Soviet Union at risk of
what happened in the summer of 1941.
During this period, Soviet thinking
was “disoriented,” and “the Germans were presented not as enemies but as friends
or as it is now fashionable to say “partners.” As a result, “neither the
society nor the army was morally and psychologically prepared for war.” Because
of “the subjective mistakes” of Stalin, “the peoples of the USSR had to pay a
very high price.”
Many in Moscow and even in the
Kremlin view the situation in Ukraine as marginal, as something that Russia can
resolve by cooperating with the West and making concessions. But that is a
mistake just like the one Stalin made 70 years ago. In fact, he says, “the fate
of Russia and the entire world depends” on whether Putin follows in Stalin’s
footsteps or makes the right choice.
At present, the commentator says,
the situation in Ukraine has left Putin with only three choices: The first is
to agree to be a protectorate of the West and fulfill all its demands, including
the surrender of the Donbas, Crimea, Transdniestria, Abkhazia and South Osetia
and giving “freedo to homosexuals, sectarians, Islamists and all other
Russophobes” at home.
The second is to launch a first
strike, to introduce forces into Ukraine, to take Kyiv, and to install in power
there “people from the south-east regions of the country.” Such people will “carry
out de-Nazification, defeat the Banderite underground, carry out
federalization, and hold new democratic elections.”
This variant, Aleksandrov continues,
would also involve “Russian recognition of the independence of Transdniestria
and Gagauzia” and a purge of “representatives of the pro-Western fifth column” in
the Russian government and mass media.
Of course, this action would lead to
a confrontation with the West, but the West is not that united and doesn’t
control as much of the world’s economy as it did in the past. Russia could
survive any of its sanctions and could even come out of them stronger because
of the development of its own industrial base.
And the third variant Putin might
choose is “the model of Stalin’s behavior in1940-1941,” a combination of
rejecting concessions demanded by the West, not launching a first strike, and seeking
to avoid having the Ukrainian crisis grow into something larger. “This variant
does not mean inevitable defeat, but it raises the price of victory many times
over.”
If Putin chooses this path, one
resembling the one Stalin selected, it “will lead to extremely negative
consequences for the national security of Russia.” Without Russian
intervention, Donetsk and Luhansk will “inevitably” be defeated, and Ukraine
will be transformed into “a militarized and anti-Russian country with a population
of 40 million.”
Then, Ukraine
backed by the West will “renew its claims on Crimea, put up obstacles to
economic activity on the Black Sea shelf, and impose a harsh blockade of
Transdniestria.” Moscow will then have to choose again between yet more
concessions or “a military confrontation with this new Ukraine.”
In short, the Moscow commentator
says, “the third variant will not bring Russia any real benefits and on the contrary
is connected with additional constraints and losses as a rest of which it will
be scarcely better than the second variant and perhaps even worse.”
At present, Putin seems attached to
this third variant because it flows from the pattern of decisions he has
already made. But that is a mistake, and he has a chance now to go in a new
direction. The Russian president has
strengthened Russia at home but in the pursuit of good relations with the West,
he has undermined Russia’s position abroad.
Hoping that concessions will change
the interests of the West is a fool’s errand. Nothing Moscow can do will be
enough to do that, Aleksandrov argues. Such a change “has not happened and
cannot take place,” whatever the Kremlin offers. Consequently,Russia must
pursue its own interests.
“The time has come,” Aleksandrov
says, “for a re-assessment of Russian foreign policy in the Euro-Atlantic
direction ... to publicly acknowledge that the strategy toward the West conducted
since the 2000s has suffered a defeat, and to draw corresponding conclusions”
from that fact.
And the Moscow analyst suggests four
conclusions that he believes Moscow should reach. First, he says, opportunities for cooperation
with the West are “quite limited” and carry “essential risks.” Sacrificing Russia’s security interests to
preserve economic cooperation is “unacceptable.”
Second, he argues that efforts by
Moscow “to play on the contradictions and create a split between the US and the
EU are a senseless waste of time and resources.” The two agree at a strategic level if not
always at a tactical one. It would be
better to force the West into talks by threatening its interests elsewhere in
the world.
Third, given that the West is
ignoring international law despite Moscow’s appeals, Moscow should not worry
about following it either. And fourth, “only
a demonstration and application of one’s own force can give a positive result,”
as was the case in South Osetia and Crimea.
“Exactly the same approach must be applied to Ukraine.”
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